










Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van Roermund, G. C. G. J. (1997). Jurisprudential Dilemmas of European Law. Law and philosophy, 16(4), 357-
376.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
BERT VAN ROERMUND1
JURISPRUDENTIAL DILEMMAS OF EUROPEAN LAW2
Accepted February 22, 1995
ABSTRACT. Making a first sketch of philosophical issues arising from European
Community law I want to present a series of more or less obvious, and more or
less interrelated dilemmas, or even ‘double binds’. (i) Deepening the community
becomes incompatible with widening membership. (ii) National states seem both
necessary for and obstructive in articulating transnational problems. (iii) The
more democracy is needed as a warrant for the public exercise of political power
in Europe, the more the very concept of democracy on a European scale evades
understanding. (iv) European unity presupposes a unifying rule of law, while
member states have radically different conceptions of this principle. (v) Even the
very core of European integration, the common market, is subject to two conflicting
and, indeed, incompatible doctrines of competition. In explaining the nature of
each dilemma I will try to take my cue from the Maastricht Treaty wherever this
seems suitable. Then I will elaborate on the jurisprudential problems involved in
it. Finally, each section will be closed by an attempt to state the nature of these
problems in philosophical terms.
KEY WORDS: common market, democratic deficit, European citizenship, Euro-
pean law, identity of Europe
1. FIRST DILEMMA: EITHER EUROPEAN OR A COMMUNITY
Art A of the Union Treaty gives us the most all-embracing political
aim that could be formulated in Maastricht in 1992. The Treaty
allegedly marks: ‘(: : : ) a new step in the process of an ever more
solid compact between the peoples of Europe’. The suggestion of
the phrase is that the name ‘Europe’ has an extension, the class of
European peoples, and that these peoples should engage in a political
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process rendering the name ‘Europe’ a new intension, namely some
form of intended uniting. European unity should be made out of a
given entity, ‘European peoples’. The given is supposed to be there,
as a positum, for politics to manipulate in a certain way.3a
During a very recent and short period of time in European history,
from 1950 till 1989, this was more or less correct. Though the start
of the European community did not include all European countries,
it was at least clear which countries were to be included in the future:
a finite number. At least we knew which countries should unite and
which should be banned from this enterprise, as they were on the
other side of the great divide. Since 1989 however – the Fall of the
Iron Curtain – we no longer know that. The existence of the Curtain
since the Second World War had caused, of course, many problems.
But it also solved at least one: the problem of where to put an end
to Europe when it came to unity. But now, Europe has regained its
peculiar status of being a continent missing one border. Many of
the former Soviet satellite states have become serious candidates for
joining the European Community, and so have parts of the former
Soviet Union itself. Though there may still be geographical reasons
to hold that ‘somewhere’ in Russia and Turkey a different continent
begins, there is no political decision that transforms this ‘somewhere’
into a clear cut border. Europeans no longer know where ‘us’ stops
and ‘them’ starts. In other words: we – the offspring of ancient
Greece – have lost our barbarians.3
This situation is about to become the watershed for a well-known
dilemma of policies in the EC: either widening or deepening the
community. Both of these policies have awkward consequences of
their own. The policy of deepening carries with it strategies of exclu-
sion. The policy of widening runs the risk of making the Community
unmanageable. To put it in another way: if you don’t expand or widen
membership, you will not have a European community (as it will
not embrace all the European countries); but if you do expand, you
will end up with great diversity and without a European community.
This dilemma in itself is far from new. It has been on the European
agenda from the very start of the process of unification. Remember
3a See H. Lindahl, Welfare and Enlightenment. Leuven, Leuven University
Press, 1995.
3 Which (by the way) may be one of the explanations why we seem to try and
invent them in our midst.
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the growth from six to seven to nine to twelve members. Remember
also the periodical discussions about whether and when members of
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) should enter or associate. But
until recently, the great constructors of Europe were able to maintain
that the policies of widening and deepening Europe have proven to
go hand in hand. There are strong signs that this thesis has lost its
persuasive force already with the recent growth of the EC. One exam-
ple is the fierce criticism launched by the European Court of Justice,
when the European Council in 1991 submitted that a new organisa-
tion of economic cooperation should be created: the EES (European
Economic Space), which was meant, in the Council’s mind, to
become a sort of EEC revisited, especially designed for starters in
European market cooperation, with its own council, committee and
court. The Court of Justice in Luxemburg vehemently opposed what
it regarded as a danger for the development of a unified European
jurisdiction and, thus, as an assault on the authority of law in a Euro-
pean context. It has to be conceded that the EES Treaty of 1 January
1994 aims at a major effort to once more combine both expanding and
upholding the EC’s ‘acquis communautaire’, but it is fair to say that
the size and complexity of this operation4 nourishes serious doubts
about its prospects in real political life. A second sign is found in
the fact that ‘the Europe of two velocities’ (or ‘multi-speed Europe’)
has gained not only a gradually increasing popularity as an issue
for debate in the bodies of the EC (remember proposed solutions of
the ‘crises’ caused by the initial ‘no’ of the Danish referendum), but
also the status of an acknowledged strategy since the social chapter
of the Maastricht Treaty allowed the UK to follow its own path.
As a third indication may serve the ‘talk of the town’ (Biesheuvel)
that the cases Keck and Mithouard (free trade of goods under art.
30 EC5), Reiff, OHRA and Meng (competition6) and Schindler (free
trade of services7) show a new tendency in the Court’s policy: to
stand at ease when it comes to intensifying the proper character of
European law. The common denominator in these cases is that the
4 Biesheuvel, ‘Een tussenstand in het European recht’, in Nederlands Juris-
tenblad (Kroniek), 69, 1994, p. 41, notes that the full text of the Treaty with all its
protocols and annexes would exceeded 200.000 pages.
5 Comb. decisions 24-11-1993, C-267/91 and C-268/91.
6 All decisions of 17-11-1993, resp. C-185/91, C-245/91 and C-2/91.
7 Decision 24-03-1994, C-275/92.
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Court chose to restrain (rather than to exhaust) the impact of certain
paragraphs in the EC Treaty, and that it even constrained its own
previous decisions. It is not certain whether this is indeed a more
general tendency or whether there are perfectly good explanations
for the separate cases. Anyway, the dilemma of widening and deep-
ening takes a radically new plunge now that the very extension of
the name ‘Europe’ seems to be a rather fuzzy set.
From a philosophical point of view, the basic problem is the fol-
lowing. With Claude Lefort8 one may want to distinguish between la
politique (politics in the empirical sense of the word) and le politique
(the quality most characteristic of politics, i.e. its specific perspec-
tive). The latter is bound up with a sort of conceptual bootstrapping:
if the political has to do with the management of society, it presup-
poses a society becoming transparent to itself as a limited whole. No
point within society itself can mark the departure of this referential
gesture, as it always designates particular spheres of interest. There-
fore, a detour has to be made in order for this referential performance
to be succesful. An imaginary staging of the original residence of
power beyond the social group will have to be set up in order for this
group to identify itself as a particular society in iuxtaposition with
others. Thus, from the inner point of view of a certain society, poli-
tics begins by symbolic reference to an imaginary transsocial source
where this society derives its identity from, as a first person plural,
in contradistinction to its neighbours, the others. It will include ‘us’,
by necessity excluding ‘them’. Note that this is ‘only’ a conceptual
implication of the political: though it will be a primary element in
real politics, it will (hopefully) not be the only one. In my view,
the characteristic quality of politics brought about by the virtue of
justice will precisely work on making this inclusion/exclusion less
definitive. But this cannot, never, mean that the inclusive/exclusive
identification can be skipped, as long as it remains a fact that
law and justice are political artefacts. It can be mitigated, and
justice is mitigating it in advance, on one’s own account, so to
speak.
Under the regime of the great divide between western and eastern
Europe, this self-inclusive reference to ‘Europe’ was readily under-
8 See Cl. Lefort, Essais sur le politique, XIX-XXme siècles (Paris, Du Seuil,
1986), especially the essay ‘Permanence du théologico-politique’.
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stood as designating a clear-cut border which was both more than
observable and very transsocial indeed (as it was the result of the
World War). But now that the Iron Curtain is gone, where should ‘we,
Europeans’ (as Nietzsche calls us) refer to in order to make Europe
transparent for us as a limited whole? The European Community
finds no such source any more to articulate its identity. It has lost its
bootstrapping mechanism of politics. That explains why there is so
much talk at the moment about ‘a new identity for Europe’, (quite
comparably to the years immediately after the Second World War),
with reference to human rights and democracy as the legitimate heirs
of christendom and Ancient Greece. But must we, Europeans, really
reassure ourselves of this self-proclaimed humanness? Can we really
not afford to admit that elsewhere, in cultures different from ours,
respect for humans and accountable government have taken on forms
which we have not even begun to understand? Are we the champions
before the game has even started? The facts are that, notwithstand-
ing a fair level of democracy and respect for human rights in the
member states, the Union (or the Community) itself has a history of
poor performance in both respects.9
Perhaps we must acknowledge that the name of Europe has
returned to its origin; which was, according to what J.-P. Faye calls
a daring hypothesis,10 to take part in a structure of oppositional ref-
erences. From some first person point in the Middle East not known
exactly to us here and now, reference was made to the land where
the sun set (Erp, the semitic root ereb means: to lay down) and
the land where the sun rose (Arb). This linguistic hypothesis is of
course only a dummy for political identification. But it is at least
9 As to democracy, there is general doubt about the EU’s performance. As to
human rights, even after Maastricht the relationship of the Union to the ECHR
remains uneasy. In spite of art. F (imposing respect for human rights), the Court of
Justice has no jurisdiction in this area (art. L, TEU). The recent advice 2/94 of 28
March 1996 by the Court contains the view that the EC Treaty does not allow the
Community to become a party to the ECHR as this would exceed the expressly
stated competence of the Community. The proposals for revision of the treaties
by the Irish presidency (December 1996) do no mention any effort to change
this. See D. Curtin and Y. de Klerk, ‘De Europese Unie en het Europees Verdrag
voor de Rechten van de Mens. Een nieuwe fase in een lat-relatie?’, in Nederlands
Juristenblad, 72, 1997, pp. 202–210.
10 J.-P. Faye, L’Europe une. Les philosophes et l’Europe. Préf. de Jacques Delors
(Paris, Gallimard, 1992), p. 19.
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a hint from our own history: perhaps Europe is bound to articulate
its identity from what it is in opposition to, much as neighbouring
villages gives opposite names to the roads that link them. Or, in a
more down-to-earth vocabulary, what the European Union calls its
‘external relations’ may become much more important for the Euro-
pean identity in the future. For the time being, however, the agony of
drifting Asia-bound will undermine rather than reinforce the identity
of Europeans.
2. SECOND DILEMMA: NATIONALISM BETWEEN
SUPRA-NATIONALISM AND REGIONALISM
The second dilemma to face – following from the first one – is this:
that we seem to need the borders of national states in order to identify,
to articulate, and perhaps even to solve the problems that transcend
these borders, the transnational problems; and that, therefore, we
will have to re-establish what we try to reach beyond. The text of the
Maastricht Treaty conceals this dilemma in places as (among others)
again para. A (where the Union is said to organise the relationships
between both the member states and the peoples of the member
states), and para. B where the principle of subsidiarity is introduced
with reference to para. 3 B EEC. This is not a matter of semantics.
The problem is not that the very meaning of ‘transnational’ still
presupposes the meaning of ‘national’ being established. It is, rather,
a matter of political culture.
Habermas, in an annex to his book on legal philosophy, observes
that what is called the nation-state in western political culture is a
hybrid historical amalgam that we will have to come to conceptual
grips with, rather than a clear-cut political concept in itself. It con-
tains elements of the following: (1) pre-political, rather small-scale
ethnic associations (Kant uses the word ‘Nation’ in this sense), with
characteristic differences among them in language, awareness of
the past and culture; (2) large-scale political aggregations, based on
(rare) federal agreement or (frequent) imperial conquering of territo-
ries (especially since the Middle Ages), functionally linked to united
or separated markets and their economic forces (especially those of
capitalism); (3) ideological referents of ascriptions of sovereignty
(notably since the various Great Revolutions), i.e. virtual initiators
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of democratic, collective political acting.11 I think that a fourth one
should be added: (4) more or less authoritative administrations of
socio-economic welfare. What we see in actual contemporary prac-
tice in Western Europe are more or less stable democratic organ-
isations of large-scale territorial states, in a more or less peaceful
compact of ethnic differences, which are more or less succesful in
administratively transmitting economically profitable spin-off to the
social welfare of their citizens.
Therefore, the more European unity becomes a political reality,
the more we must ask if we should not become very precise and
possessive about our national states as the sole platforms where, at
this point in history, a reflective equilibrium of political heterogeneity
and homogeneity should be found. This question is neither inspired
by romantic sentiments about regional cultural heritage (although
that is a problem, too), nor by spontaneous distaste of Brussels’
bureaucracy (although that is a nuisance even if not a problem). On
the contrary, to be precise about our national states will turn out to
include erasing these suspect sentiments. The real motive should be
much more rational: it may well be that national states represent
the largest scale on which we are able to discuss, if not to solve,
supra-national problems. For instance, the supra-national problem
of the pollution of the river Rhine by the Alsace potassium mines, to
the detriment of Dutch greenhouse owners, can only be articulated
as an environmental problem (rather than an insurance-problem or
a waste-distribution problem) because it has to be moulded in terms
of national interests on both sides.
However, this paradox, in spite of its theoretical attractiveness,
has definite ambiguities. When we look at the two main official
models of European integration, the federal model and the intra-
governmental model, we see that they both presuppose this hybrid
concept of a nation-state as a framework to understand the proper
agents of European integration. Also note that these models of inte-
gration themselves are far from homogeneous. What is in fact aimed
at is never a strong form of federalism or intra-governmentalism, but
something in-between; a hybrid transnational off-spring, generated
11 J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts
und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. 2. Aufl., Frankfurt a.M., 1992: 633ff. I am
summarizing his argument here.
laphe2.tex; 8/08/1997; 14:00; v.6; p.7
364 BERT VAN ROERMUND
by agent-states that have to repress their own hybrid character in their
generative acts in the first place. Thus, they run the risk of losing their
own credibility as an integrating force on a more basic level while
trying to integrate on a higher level. Moreover, the nationalism of
the 19th and 20th centuries has shown that nation states can be very
obstructive, if not downright generative, of transnational problems.
Instead of being a framework for solving regional political problems,
the borders of national states often became the very expression of
these problems. Shifting national borders, as the experiences of the
(re-)unification of Germany and the (re-)segregation of Czechoslo-
vakia prove, seems to be a mode rather than a framework to articulate
regional problems.
To bring these difficulties to a philosophical level, we will have
to re-think the concept of state in a European context. At first sight
we are inclined to say that European law is law without a state. But
that is only true if we believe that the national state is the only one
around, and that it is in need of revision. This does not have to be
the case. The national state is not just something which has to be
re-interpreted into something new; it is first and foremost already
a specific interpretation of what the concept of state is supposed
to mean in relation to a legal order. The concept of state itself, is
analytically tied up with that of law, to the extent that it is implicit
in the idea of law that its representatives form a collective body
of law-enactment and law-enforcement that is itself subject to law.
The concept of state is a concept which can be defined in terms
independent from ethnic or national elements, though we may safely
assume that it will impossible to give it any cutting edges without
involving these elements in it. But the state, in many of its historical
guises, is nothing more or less than an organisation of the publicity
of the exercise of political power before the law. Even the national
state was and is the servant of that primary purpose. What the French
Revolution has achieved, and Kant acknowledged, was not only the
change from ‘le roi’ to ‘la loi’ as the keystone of a legal order; it
also achieved a change from ‘le secret du roi’ into ‘le publique de
la loi’ when it came to giving this legal order its potential to act in
unity. So what we will have to rethink in fact is how in our day and
on a European scale, the public character of political power under
the rule of law can be articulated and accounted for. Modern media
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of mass-communication and their quality, international discussion
among lawyers, joint enterprises of workers will perhaps turn out to
be more inherent to the concept of state than we could ever imagine.
For the moment, however, the poor public character of a host of
European decision-making12 makes us wonder how we can ever
make any progress in forming this new concept of state. This is
particularly worrying as neither the procedures of democracy nor
the idea of the rule of law itself constitute real thresholds in letting
the public character of political power slip away.
3. THIRD DILEMMA: THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY
Let us pass on to this third and famous dilemma of European Law:
the more urgent the need of building a democratic and, thus, public
Europe, the more the concept of democracy itself becomes evasive,
in both its aspects of representation and participation.
The democratic character of the EC is often criticised on two
points: a) on the level of institutions, the poor powers of the Euro-
pean parliament are laughed at by ‘true democrats’; and the changes
brought about by the Union Treaty of Maastricht (art. J.7) will not
stop their laughing; b) the involvement with and commitment to the
European political cause from the part of the citizens (see art. B) is
less than modest. The way in which some national authorities try
to mend these malfunctions by TV commercials ranks high on the
scale of oversimplification. It is, in any way, not on a par with the
nature of the problems at hand.
These are problems about our very understanding of what democ-
racy is about.
  In speaking about the ‘democratic deficit’ on the institutional
level, we pretend that we have some democracy scale by which
we measure the European species of democracy and establish
that it is less than we asked for. It is suggested that pleas for an
increase of the (legislative) power of the European parliament,
for constraints on the competences of the European Commission,
for better procedures to elect judges in the Court of Justice flow
12 Vgl. D. Curtin – H. Meijers, ‘Openbaarheid in Europa’, in Nederlands Juris-
tenblad, 70, 1995, 158–180.
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from just such a measurement procedure. Of course, it is nothing
of the kind. In fact we know very well that a simple enlargment of
the democratic procedures from a national to a communitarian
level, will not establish democracy in the European Union. It
would be hard to imagine the European Parliament taking on
full legislative power and control, regarding the Commission as
its executive administration, claiming that it is democratically
authorised to do so, while we realise ourselves at the same time
that both the virtues and the vices of present national parlia-
mentary practice would be painted on a larger canvass. We will
have to address not only the question of how we can make
Europe a more democratic place, but also the question what we
would count as democracy? What concept of democracy makes
us say that Europe ‘is not democratic enough’ rather than ‘too
democratic already’? How can we know of a democratic deficit
without having knowledge of a democratic ideal?
  When it comes to the commitment of citizens to the European
public cause, things tend to get even more vague, if not danger-
ous. It is readily understood as a deficit of a common ‘feeling’.
And it is easily suggested that such a deeply felt popular aware-
ness ‘that we are all Europeans’,13 would be a precondition for
sound democratic structures on a supra-national scale. For how
else, it is added, could parliament represent the will of the people,
if there is no such thing as a people in the first place. This type of
argument probably inhibits a major fallacy about the meaning of
references to ‘the people’ in the concept of democracy. Although
the doctrine of popular sovereignty is a rather received one on
the national level, the mimetic character of these references is
commonly misunderstood. In a philosophically feasible account
of democracy, the phrase ‘the people’ stands for a virtual point
of reference rather than an entity, let alone an empirical entity.
But although it is a virtual, it is by no means ‘unreal’. It is a sort
of counterfactual grid that determines the format of parliamen-
13 A phrase that cannot escape from Nietzsche’s cynicism. For a more extensive
account of Nietzsche’s attitude towards Europe, see B. van Roermund, ‘We, Euro-
peans. On the Very Idea of a Common Market in European Community Law’, in
Fr. Fleerackers, E. van Leeuwen and B. van Roermund (eds.), Law, Life and the
Image of Man. Festschrift Jan M. Broekman (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1996),
pp. 455ff.
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tary parlance. It is an obligatory format, rather than a piece, or
even a source, of political argument, not unlike – according to
Kantorowicz – ‘the will of the King’ was the proper and unique
format of political argument under the Ancient Regime.
Though a feeling of ‘we’ is unnecessary and dangerous, demo-
cratic political institutions require a whole climate of democracy,
a democratic culture, which constitutes the referent ‘the people’ in
accounts of democracy. As an advice for political education, this
is probably right. Democracy in politics could profit from a social
climate of tolerance, from a less autoritarian style of government,
from real participation by workers in the property of industrial enter-
prises. But on the other hand, as an account of democracy in philo-
sophical terms, it raises a lot of questions. One of the most pertinent
is this: is European culture such that it can grow democratic on its
own account, or does that culture go against the grain of democracy?
At first sight, European culture, especially since the days of Enlight-
enment, seems the very cradle of democracy. But can our culture,
as it conceives of itself, be democratic in the sense that it allows
equality in freedom for everyone in virtue of each and every person
experiencing the other ‘as of the same essence’ – to use Kelsen’s
phrase? Both Rousseau and Freud, to mention just two critics of
Western culture, doubted very much if it could. Democracy as a
‘vaterlose Gesellschaft’14 – a fatherless society – is at odds with a
culture which cannot conceive of itself but in terms of a Great Leg-
islator (an archetype Father) who is beyond the law. The best such
a culture can do is to establish democracy as an artificial, mitigating
counterweight to its inherent tendency of diversification and hetero-
geneity, inherent that is to the eternal quarrels about who is to be the
legitimate heir of Reason (the sciences? technology? economics?
the artists X or Y, mother Theresa?). But if it is indeed artificial,
this implies that democracy will always be dependent on authorita-
tive exemplification, endorsement, enhancement and enforcement.
The question really is: Do we have the courage to face the dilemma
between our concept of western culture and our concept of democ-
racy?
14 To borrow a phrase from Kelsen, which Kelsen himself borrowed from his
Vienna co-citizen Freud.
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4. FOURTH DILEMMA: EUROPEAN LAW AND THE LAW OF THE EC
I said that the concept of state on a European scale would have to
return to its roots in the idea of ‘public exercise of political power
before the law’. In the previous section I touched on the problem of
publicity, bound up with democracy. Now I turn to the other half of
the phrase: the rule of law. The next dilemma I want to go into is
this: European unity presupposes a unifying rule of law, while the
very concept of the rule of law is fundamentally ambiguous among
the member states of the EC. In fact there are radically different,
even conflicting ideas on what parameters are determinative for the
keystone of a legal order.15 To simplify a bit, one could say that there
are at least three main ghost-types that have haunted the castle of the
EEC since a few decades: the French, the German, the English ideal
type of what constitutes a legal order.
  The French idea of legalité circles around the presupposition of
a self-referring, closed system of rules in a virtually deductive
axiomatic order. Of course this is not the way law is applied
in France on a day-to-day basis. It is the pattern that emerges
when one tries to connect a series of remarkable dots in the legal
landscape that is shaped by the Napoleonic tradition of civil
law. And even then it emerges probably only under political or
economic pressure. In the context of EC law, a few of these dots
are: the remarkably reluctant attitude of France, in particular
the Conseil d’Etat, in applying EC-law, in making preliminary
references to the ECJ under Article 177, in vehemently using
the distinction between acte claire and acte éclairée.
  The German ideas behind the notions of Gesetzmäßigkeit,
Verfassungsmäßigkeit and Rechtsstaatlichkeit are considerably
different from either the French or the English ideas. Again,
this is not meant as a rigid designator of German judiciary: it
is the tentative pattern that arises when one tries to connect
several salient phenomena of handling the concept of law in
Germany and other countries in the same tradition. This has led
15 See J. Steenbergen, R. Foqué, G. de Clercq, Change and Adjustment. Exter-
nal Relations and Industrial Policy in the European Community (Deventer –
Antwerpen, Kluwer/Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1983), pp. 95ff. Foqué renders
these differences in what Weber called ‘ideal types’ – which are in fact tentatively
meaningful patterns drawn from a host of fragmentary data.
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to very awkward situations in the past, which still exist till the
present day. The most salient of these is, undoubtedly, the con-
ditional membership of Germany, as brought to the fore by the
so-called Solange decisions of 1974 and 1986. To give a very
brief summary, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) declared at these occasions, that the EC Treaty
would constitute valid law in Germany ‘as long as’ (solange)
European law as upheld by the Luxembourg Court would be
in accord with the protection of fundamental (human) rights as
offered by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Although it had nothing to complain as far as the decisions
of the Luxembourg Court were concerned,16 in 1993 the same
Bundesverfassungsgericht has given an explicit and amply moti-
vated decision on the constitutional legitimacy of the Maastricht
Treaty in a similar vein.17 So here we are: restricted membership
of Britain and Denmark since Maastricht may have, perhaps,
attracted attention, but the conditional membership of Germany
has been a far more principled one for already more than two
decades, in spite of all doctrines about acquis communautaire,
that is, about the presumed continuing validity of all prior deci-
sions and practices of community organs.
  I do not want to say much about the English idea of the rule of
law, which, as comparative lawyers teach us, is rather different
from either legalité or Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Though it is open,
rather than closed, to extra-legal contexts (like the German,
though unlike the French), it is open to social circumstances
and policies rather than to moral standards. It combines the
predictability of law with the sovereignty of Parliament, which
gave rise to long debates and texts when the UK entered the
common market.
16 In all probability, Germany shares the general understanding among EC
members, that the Luxemburg Court has done its utmost over the years to keep up
with the ECHR in its own decision making. See however also footnote 9.
17 See: R. de Lange, ‘Het Bundesverfassungsgerichtover het Verdrag van Maas-
tricht: een nieuw Solange?’ in Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving (SEW), 42, 1994,
pp. 418–436. Cf. also T. Koopmans’s analysis: ‘Rechter, D-mark en democratie:
het Bundesverfassungsgericht en de Europese Unie’, in Nederlands Juristenblad,
69, 1994, pp. 245–251. The latter believes the style of argument of the Court to
be totally obsolete, the former underlines the principled character of this doctrinal
style of reasoning.
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I submit that this heterogeneity in ideal types of what constitutes
a legal order can offer an explanation both for the emphasis with
which the Court has defended the sui generis character of European
Community law, and for the revisited utrumque ius of European law
in the broad sense, i.e. the fact that European law is not European
Community law. Post-war European integration has created two
European jurisdictions: the one of the Council of Europe, the ECHR
en the Strasbourg Court, the other of the European Community, the
EC-Treaties and their tails, and the Luxembourg Court. Lawyers
sometimes pretend that this is a matter of learning legal vocabulary.
Theirs is a profession that is able to tell the European Court in
Strasbourg from the European Court in Luxembourg, or even the
European Council from the Council of Europe. Things are, however,
slightly more dramatic. The fact is that the political authority of the
EC – say the presidents and prime-ministers – has been notoriously
reluctant towards the ECHR. Only since the Maastricht Treaty, an
explicit paragraph of the text itself is devoted to fundamental rights
(see art. F). But even at this point in time, the EC as such did not
consider to enter the ECHR. The EU cannot consider it, as it is
not a legal person itself. Becoming a party to the ECHR could be
interpreted by the member states as favouring one of the ideal-types
of legality, namely the German one, at the cost of the others.
What we see here, in all its clarity, is the philosophical problem of
legal pluralism. Of course it is easy to accept legal pluralism from the
external point of view. How can one not recognise that different legal
cultures are involved in most of our legal systems, that they often
show traces of clashes and intertwinements, that they change over
time, dependent on socio-economic circumstances such as migration
of workers from third world countries to Western Europe? But this
is the external point of view which a sociologist could take. If we
try and formulate legal pluralism from the internal point of view, we
often stop at the point where we realise that a legal order just cannot
afford to refrain from affirming itself as a unity, and that therefore a
plurality of ultimate points of references to ground a rule or a decision
in such an order is inconceivable. The most we can (and do) conceive
of is a certain complexity in the unity of a single legal order, such
that it is elastic enough to integrate (very) heterogeneous elements
into one framework. But this integration will always contain, or so
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it seems, one final point of reference in case these heterogeneous
elements come into conflict with one another. So from the internal
point of view, legal pluralism seems to be a rather gratuitous phrase,
to indicate a certain degree of tolerance inherent to the legal order.
We should also be careful not to confuse ‘legal pluralism’ with
a certain political virtue called justice. Essentially, justice is self-
imposed self-restraint in politics. It is politics which, of its own
account, allows something to count against the very core of its plan-
ning and acting, the identity of the specific society it attempts to
rule. So justice politics will already be ‘pluralistic’ in this profound
sense. Now the concept of law, in as far as it is dependent on such
an idea of justice, will share this pluralism in politics. But if it is to
institutionalise this shared understanding of justice, it will have to
do it in a way which is not in itself pluralistic again. In the end law is
bound to be a monolithic institutional defense of political pluralism,
or so it seems.
5. FIFTH DILEMMA: THE IDEA OF A COMMON MARKET
The last dilemma I want to present goes to the very self-professed
heart of European community law: the idea of a common market. The
problem here is that ‘common market’ seems to be a rather symbolic
expression, which boils down to what is called an internal market
as soon as we talk real legal business. And indeed, to go right to
the core of the question: it seems that where there is a market, there
is virtually no community (but self-oriented competition), while
on the other hand, where there is community, there is no market
(but co-operation). As the market is usually defined as the place
where competing offers and demands meet, there is not much that is
common in a market. Of course, as in the case of Europe, members
of a ‘community’ may decide to join hands in order to protect their
market from others. But in that joint effort, their acts are not acts ‘in
the market’, as they do not amount to competing offers and demands.
Let me be more explicit about this.
It is, of course, not so hard to explain the concept of a common
market in economic or legal terms. Economically, a common market
is a non-segmented market, with large areas for trade. Legally
spoken, this economic phenomenon is translated in terms of the four
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celebrated freedoms, together with the prohibition of false competi-
tion.
But that is not all there is to it. Signs of worry about the very
concept of a common market in political parlance can be found
in a shift of vocabulary that was going on already underneath the
surface of communal politics, but which emerged first in the single
European Act and now in the Union Treaty: the phrase ‘internal
market’ is preferred over and above that of the ‘common market’.
As and for itself, this would be rather innocent, if it would be,
indeed, a lexical matter which could be clarified unambiguously
by authoritative interpretation. The fact is that it cannot. In a Dutch
textbook on the law of the European Community,18 the authors claim
that the common market is nothing but the internal market. In their
view, the latter is a clarification of the former and boils down to the
four freedoms mentioned already. To substantiate their claim, they
refer to some sources which, on closer examination, cast serious
doubts on the feasibility of the initial thesis.
  The first reference is to P. VerLoren van Themaat, ‘De Europese
Akte’, in: SEW, 1986: 464–473. This author, however, states
that the common market embraces far more than an internal
market, in particular the provisions against false competition
and for equal development in solidarity with poor regions and
a communal policy of trading in external relationships. That
in itself is a surprising interpretation in the light of the next
reference, which stems from Dutch parliamentary reports:
  The second reference is to an explanation by the Dutch govern-
ment (TK, nr. 19.626, nr. 3 (MvT): 6–7; 11 en nr. B (NT): 4
(Statutory approval of the European Act). The Dutch govern-
ment asserts in parliament that the internal market is committed
to ‘a more embracing concept of integration’ than the common
market. In other words, the Dutch government wanted to believe
that both VerLoren van Themaat and Lauwaers/Timmermans are
wrong.
18 R. Lauwaers and Timmermans, Europees Gemeenschapsrecht in kort bestek.
3e herz. dr. (Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1994), pp. 139–144.
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  This, again, is surprising in the light of the third reference,
which is to ECJ 15/81, JUR 1982: 1431–32.19 Here the Court of
Justice itself declares: ‘The concept of the common market, as
developed by the Court in a coherent series of decisions, goes to
the abolition of all impediments of intra-communitarian trading,
in order to unify the national markets into one single market,
which resembles the conditions of a national market as much
as possible. It is important that the profits of this market go not
only to trade companies, but also to private persons in case they
perform transnational transactions.’
But – pace J.L. Austin’s insights – things can not always be done
by words. It is all very well dropping the common market vocabulary
in favour of internal market vocabulary. However, Francis Snyder
has argued, with regard to something as all-important as the EC’s
sheep meat policy, that the notion of an internal market, too, can
be analysed in two different and conflicting ways, depending on
what he calls two different ‘ideologies of competition’.20 Here is the
dilemma regarding the conception of full competition underlying the
notion of the internal market.
  The first view asserts that the primary, though perhaps not exclu-
sive purpose of sheep meat policy has to be the establishing of a
completely free internal market for sheep meat trade, even to the
point where it would entail ignoring the sharp fall in income of
farmers who would be the victim of the subsequent operations
of the market. To mitigate the consequences for their positions
would be rather a matter of blocking unwanted side-effects to the
extent that it is compatible with the primary goal. By departing
from this view, one may make a clear-cut distinction between
what can and should be done on the internal level on the one
hand, and what is desirable or permissible in external relations
on the other.
19 Responding to a prejudicial question ex. art. 177 EEC by the Dutch Court of
Den Bosch in the case Schul/Inspecteur Invoerrechten en Accijnzen te Roosendaal,
concerning the interpretation of pars. 13 and 95 EEC and art. 2. sect. 2 of the 6th
Directive (Harmonisation VAT).
20 F. Snyder, New directions in European community law (London, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1990) (Law in context).
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  The alternative view believes it to be the task of a policy of
‘full competition’ to primarily provide a legal framework for
negotiable mutual tuning of traditionally very different market
structures presently existing in different parts of the EC. This is
a process of gradual harmonisation which aims at developing all
parts of the EC to a sort of ‘competing competence’. Means such
as pricing policy, import policy, supportive income policy are not
derivative instruments, but primary goals to attain. Internal and
external relations should, according to this view, be integrated.
This is, by the way, what VerLoren van Themaat also stressed
with regard to the idea of a common market in the article already
mentioned.
These two radically different, indeed conflicting views on full
competition bear directly on the interpretation of the core of Euro-
pean community law, the paragraphs 85–94 of the EC Treaty. As
these paragraphs must be read in the light of the provisions on policy
purposes, as formulated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, the dilemma of
interpretation bears on the essence of the Treaty itself. What is to
be understood, for instance, by fraudulent competition, is to a large
extent dependent on which of the two views regarding full compe-
tition is to be preferred. According to the first view, it will be any
impediment that could be expected to interfere with the free market.
According to the second view, it will be to lift impediments without
proper deliberation between partners.
It is of little use to ask which of the two ideologies is embraced by
the Court of Justice, so that it can deemed the official one. It is by no
means coincidental that the Court uses a rather neutral formula when
it points to ‘(: : : ) the abolition of all impediments for intracommunity
free trade.’ For the European market in the economic sense is not a
homogeneous one. In some sectors, that is on some markets, almost
full freedom and unprotected competition will work out well, while
on other markets they would be disastrous, while these markets
need prudential and even altruistic economical behaviour. It is clear,
though, that when it comes to responding to social problems within
the EC, the Court prefers the latter view over and against the former.
Which shows that, given our confusing quotations, both authors and
politicians are sometimes short-sighted concerning EC law.
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Philosophically, it seems therefore worthwhile to investigate the
idea of a common market more thoroughly. The hypothesis would
be, that the ‘commonness’ apparently involved in it is not some
romantic idea about the medieval market-place, but a meaningful
element in the modern idea of a market, and which could well harbour
intrinsically legal presuppositions. These presuppositions could form
the anchor-points for a policy towards European law that would
concentrate on what is needed for the market (which may be not a
little thing), and which would refrain from intervening in each and
every aspect of social and cultural life in the member states. Such
research would concentrate on elements of communality inherent
to the market, such as common peace necessary to let trade rather
than robbery be the mechanism of ‘getting what you want’; mutual
understanding, indeed demonstration, of languages and cultures as a
background of demands and offers; protection of a sustainable place
over time (ecological commitment); limitations on capital interests
in order to restrain the phenomenon of markets in markets; in short
‘la douce commerce’ that Montesquieu already mentioned.
These five dazzling dilemmas are, I take it, disturbing as well
as wholesome. Disturbing for obvious reasons, as no one takes an
interest in agonizing choices in law. But wholesome, because these
dilemmas incite all those participating in European law to think for
themselves, and to think twice: once with their legal minds, as they
are trained to do, once with their philosophical minds, as they are
perhaps not. European community law urges to answer very pertinent
why-questions on law in general, transforming us all into temporary
philosophers. Evrp – in another, Greek etymological interpretation
the old root is said to mean ‘the far-ahead regard’.
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Steenbergen, J., G. de Clercq, R. Foqué, 1983. Change and Adjustment. External
relations and industrial policy of the European Community (Deventer, etc.:
Kluwer Law and Taxation).







laphe2.tex; 8/08/1997; 14:00; v.6; p.20
